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Introduction and Summary of the Argument
The objective of this paper is to assess the relative
merits of two styles in food marketing - one state-
controlled, the other free - from the perspective of
African producer-sellers. The terms of the debate are
those used by Mambwe cultivators in Mbala District,
near the end of the 1970s, when Zambia experienced
its first serious problem with ensuring food security.
The crisis affected both urban and rural populations.
Mambwe cultivators, among whom I did anthropo-
logical fieldwork (October 1977-November 1978),
were presented with two alternatives: either to follow
national policy and grow hybrid maize for sale to the
parastatal Northern Cooperative Union (NCU),
which liaises with the National Agricultural Marketing
Board, or to grow beans and sell them on the free
market to long-distance entrepreneurs from the Line
of Rail towns. NCU did not handle beans; nor were
private traders interested in maize.
On the face of it the two market structures were
sufficiently separated and the choice was clear-cut.
The production of surplus maize was hampered by
environmental constraints (e.g. acid soils), erratic
supply of seeds and fertilisers, low producer prices,
late collection of crops, and late payment to
producers. The marketing of beans was a happier
story. Beans grew well, prices were in tune with
inflation, long-distance traders or their local contacts
paid on the spot (much appreciated by the cash-
starved Mambwe), while the availability of beans was
boosted by a flourishing cross-border trade which
attracted produce from Tanzania. The free-market
producer price for beans was double the price paid by
state monopoly buyers in Eastern Province.
In spite of the separateness of the two strategies, and
the advantages of the bean trade, actual responses to
the choice were less clear-cut. As I researched food-
related issues, it soon transpired that many peasant
households preferred to keep both options open.
Initially, this was something of a surprise. Not only
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were the terms of trade for beans much more
favourable from the point of view of the producer, but
United National Inpendence Party (UNIP) politicians
too, including the local Member of Parliament,
endorsed the bean alternative. When not officially
engaged, Party politicians in the district showed much
sympathy with Mambwe villagers for whom the ailing
NCU bureaucracy was a constant headache.
The contrast between 'official' advice (which went
against the national food programme) and the
producers' apparent indecisiveness will be demon-
strated in the first part of this paper. A search for the
root causes of the contrast will be undertaken in part
two, where I shall conclude that the politicians' advice
to invest only in free-market beans was that of the
typical outsider whose rationality is based on a
simplistic either/or strategy.
1f planners wish to predict local responses to future
changes in national policy (including e.g., the decision,
following Berg, to spread the burden of infrastructural
responsibilities), they will need to concern themselves
with the perceptions of village-based producer-sellers,
and not just with the views of the politicians who
represent them. In the context of the state/maize
versus free/beans alternative, I shall argue that
producer-sellers (unlike district-level politicians)
perceive alternative styles in food trading not from an
either/or perspective, but in terms of their under-
standing of the local history of village agriculture. This
local history is based on shifts in the selection of
staples, shifts in the division of labour by gender, and
most important, shifts in the control over produce.
The latter shift too touches on gender lines.
Once the local history is understood, planners will be
able to understand not only the position of Party
officials, but also the position of leaders who hold
traditional office. I wish to stress here that local-level
politics involves both 'traditional' and state/Party
representation; a point which is sometimes overlooked
e.g. Van Donge 1982:98]. The co-existence of
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'modern' and 'traditional' styles of leadership within
the realm of local-level politics cannot be over-
emphasised, since the two cadres work with different
evaluative criteria when assessing the relative merits of
marketing alternatives. In the opening part of this
paper, then, I juxtapose the pro-beans attitude of
higher-ranking politicians with the behaviour of
branch leaders. Branch leaders, I show, side with their
local chief and take it upon themselves to make sure
that both marketing options remain open. The village
mode of thought will be documented with case
material about the organisation of an Agricultural
Show in the chieftaincy of Mwamba.
Chiefs are sometimes believed to be conservative, or
interested in intensified agriculture only 'when their
authority will be maintained and [the] traditional way
of life be left intact' [Nelson Richards 1982:159].
Others, also reporting on Zambia, indicate that
traditional authorities are quite capable of becoming
successful farmers themselves [Van Donge 1982:961.
What I attempt to argue in the case of political
reactions from Mwamba is that the chief's position
towards 'development', even if sometimes ambiguous,
does make sense when it is seen in the light of the local
history of food production. Chiefs may occupy
ambiguous political positions, but their views on state
intervention in agriculture are not inherently
ambiguous. Their views may well reflect, as in the case
study which follows, the dilemmas with which the
local peasantry are confronted.
I Local-Level Political Responses to
Alternative Marketing Strategies
Throughout the 1970s Zambia's leaders strived to
achieve national self-sufficiency in maize. The
national food strategy, based on the promotion of a
hybrid (SR-52), was supported by the Agricultural
Finance Corporation (AFC) and strengthened by the
Party message that 'feeding the nation' was no less
than the duty of every citizen. In peripheral regions
like the Mambwe area, state intervention was made
possible through the provision of AFC credit. AFC
assistance, however, was confined to the allocation of
short-term, seasonal loans.
Responsible for implementing the hybrid programme
was a multi-level grid of development committees; a
patchwork organisation with elements from traditional
institutions, Party politics, and government [Bratton
1980]. From a local-level point of view, two
committees stood out as crucial to successful
implementation: the Village Productivity Committee
(VPC) and the Ward Development Committee
(WDC). The latter in particular was designed as a
forum for bringing together representatives of the
party [e.g. UNIP branch leaders, the Ward Councillor],
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traditional authorities (headmen, the local chief), and
field-based agricultural extension workers. In theory,
the WDC programme is substantial. As one Ward
Councillor put it to me, 'the task of the WDC is to
discuss development in all its aspects'. In practice,
though, WDC activity amounts to little more than the
sorting out of AFC seasonal loans.
Committee activities in Mwamba, the chieftaincy
where the case study is set, are equally restricted. But
the annual meeting does coincide with preparations
for the annual Agricultural Show. So more is at stake
than seasonal loans. The Show is an important event
and is generally thought of as a means of monitoring
local commitment to government, to UNIP, and to
'modernisation'. A poor Show would not go down
very well with the visiting bureaucrats and politicians;
it might even have repercussions. In the crisis years of
the late 1970s, staging a good Show at ward level was
doubly important. It was most necessary to impress
the 'officials' from Mbala town, since such people
were believed to influence the timetabling of NCU
collections. In the late 1 970s the services ofNCU could
no longer be taken for granted.
Case Study
The Mwamba show organisers hit a problem when
they raised money towards the Show. The systematic
collection of money, 5 ngwee per household, was
opposed by the villagers of Aron, a Watch Tower
community. Opposition from Aron was an old story,
going back to the early 1950s in fact, when the
Witnesses disobeyed the colonial administration
[Watson 1958:200-1]. What was new, this time, was
that non-Watch Tower people had become reliant on
good relations with Watch Tower for the sales of their
free-market beans. The free trade in beans was mainly
organised by long-distance entrepreneurs who them-
selves relied upon Watch Tower contacts, who ran
local buying-up depots. Most peasant households in
Mwamba would have some beans to sell in the not too
distant future, and these sales were often the only sure
way of making fast cash. A similar 'rapprochement'
between Witnesses and non-Witnesses has now also
been reported for other parts of Zambia [Long 1984:5].
I note, in passing, that government officials in the
district tolerated the free market. They were well
aware of the problems the national food strategy
posed, particularly since NCU, as it operated from
Mbala in 1978, relied on private entrepreneurs for the
collection of surplus maize [GRZ 1977:28]. Their
awareness was communicated to village cultivators
whenever the politicians were 'off duty'. The Member
of Parliament for Mwamba, for instance, would be
heard telling locals:
The surplus maize you have grown this year is still
awaiting collection. NCU has transport problems,
and we all know that they are serious. Rain is
certain to destroy half of our surplus harvests. No
such problems with beans! Copperbelt traders or
their associates from Mbala will drive up to your
villages and collect at your doorsteps. They will pay
you good prices too.
The mood of the villagers in Aron reflected their
growing confidence that the agricultural prosperity of
rural Mbala now depended solely on the smoothness
with which 'their' people managed the long-distance
trade in beans. Even UNIP leaders acknowledged this.
But would the Witnesses get away with their refusal to
contribute to the agricultural show?
Although Aron's village was in a strong position, its
refusal to contribute was not acceptable to their local
chief. Chief Mwamba, who had fought many 'battles'
with Aron (and, ironically, just as many with UNIP)
became enraged when he heard of the refusal. He was
informed of it by a UNIP branch leader who, cleverly,
had judged that it was inappropriate to bring pressure
upon Aron via the channels of either the Party or the
Ward Development Committee. The branch leader
reasoned that only Chief Mwamba himself, as a
traditional ruler, would succeed in settling the dispute.
Chief Mwamba accepted. He instructed the villagers
of Aron to pay up, (in his words) 'even should their
headman continue to refuse'. He added emphatically
that 'should the villagers also refuse, then, I shall expel
them from my territory and will depose their
headman'. A messenger informed the headman of
Aron, and the whole village agreed to pay up.
The question now is, how can we make sense of this
show of strength by the traditional authority? How
could he so successfully challenge the stronger party in
the dispute?
Mwamba's recourse to customary sanction was not
just a way of implementing the wishes of the new men
in power (UNIP politicians, bureaucrats). The clue to
the riddle lies in the branch leader's request that the
matter be solved by the traditional authority. The
request was a face-saving diplomatic move. By taking
the dispute to the 'traditional' chief, the branch leader
was able to avoid a community clash (and a personal
clash) with the Watch Tower congregation. He could
have left the Chief out of the procedures and could
have attempted to settle the matter through pressure
from 'officials' (himself, other branch leaders, the
Ward Councillor, other WDC members). However,
that option would have put too much emphasis on the
issue of allegiance to UNIP and to the nation-state.
That would have been dangerous. The branch leader
chose to solve the dispute outside the Party and
outside the 'official' development structures, for it was
in his own interest (as the prominent shopkeeper of a
large amalgamated village), and therefore in the
interest of many other villagers, that he maintained
good relations with local Watch Tower groups. Aron
was a test case. The involvement of the traditional
chief was also welcomed by Aron's headman (who,
note, had been assigned a low-level function in the
Party), since his decision to contribute after all did not
result in any loss of face. Within the terms chosen for
settling the dispute, Aron's headman had merely given
in to 'our chief' (mwene mwitu), to someone senior in
the organisation of his own lineage.
But there is another dimension to the way this dispute
was settled. The chief himself had been anxious to
make Aron contribute, in order to be seen to be towing
the Party/development line. He knew, what local
politicians ignored when they sympathised with the
bean option, namely, that his people could ill-afford to
provoke the Party. No contributions from Aron
would have brought down the wrath of UNIP, and
this, in turn, could have resulted in NCU blacking out
Mwamba when maize collections were timetabled in
Mbala. A black-out would have resulted in vital cash
losses, for the people of Mwamba still grew maize and
did not intend to switch entirely to bean cropping in
their attempts to earn cash. Their most basic view on
marketing was that they should invest in both systems.
To sum it up, the political manoeuvres that finally
persuaded the Watch Tower headman had been
successful because the chosen strategy blotted out all
possible hints of UNIP involvement. The people of
Mwamba had averted a crisis by safeguarding their
trade connections, with Watch Tower and with the
Cooperative.
II Understanding Local-Level Political
Responses
The case material above shows that the 'traditional'
chief and UNIP's branch leaders join hands to
safeguard good relations with the community which
so successfully organises free/bean trading. That is
clear enough. The question that still needs answering
though, is why the chief bothered at all about the
government/maize option. Why did he judge it wrong
to de-emphasise the need for NCU/maize trading?
The answer, I will now show, must be sought in the
specifics of the agricultural scene.
Village responses to Zambia's national food strategy
can only be understood after grasping the broad
principles of the many region-specific farming systems
found in that country. The importance of local
conditions (physical and social) and the need to plan
for location-specific environments are increasingly
emphasised [Eicher and Baker 1982:90-94; Richards
1983:21. En a similar vein, I suggest that political
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responses to alternative styles of marketing can only
be fully understood when set in the context ofthe local
food production system. This implies paying attention
to recent transformations the system may have
undergone. In its most rudimentary form, the
argument is that maize cropping is pursued in the face
of NCU's organisational problems, because peasants
living in harsh environments can only survive by
spreading options and risks. Though basically sound,
such a view remains simplistic. It is inadequate
because it neglects site-specific circumstances and
historical developments within food production at the
regional level.
Today it is commonly accepted that the soils of
Northern Zambia are ill-suited for the commercial
maize crop they carry [Dumont and Mottin 1983;
Hedlund 1984]. Nor are they suited for cereal
monocropping. A first warning signal was given
during the 1950s, when circulatory wage migration for
men was at its peak. William Watson, the
anthropologist who then researched on the Mambwe
economy, expressed his concern: 'the soil is not rich
enough and could not stand a continuous cereal crop'
[Watson 1958:24]. But Watson saw little need for
immediate action, since the area did not have a
'proper' cash crop. The discovery of SR-52 hybrid
maize in the mid-1960s changed the scene. By the late
1970s, when I started my own research, the flow of
migrant labour had come to a standstill, population
figures were up, and pressure on the land had
increased. The turning point had been the imple-
mentation of a policy to stabilise the industrial labour
force, shortly after independence. From then
onwards, the Mambwe area was increasingly cut off
from the industrial complex [Pottier 1983]. The
'obvious' alternative to wage labour was to follow
government advice and to take up commercial maize
cropping.
Watson's descriptions of the grassland fallow system
and the woodland chitemene technique, the two
systems found in Mambwe-land, are testimony of how
cultivators on the Northern plateau used to respond
intelligently to the various environmental constraints,
especially with regard to the unreliability and paucity
of rainfall receipts. The mounded grassland system,
which dominates grassland agriculture, combined
crop rotation with adequate resting periods and
ensured satisfying yields and full restoration of soil
fertility. The testimony left by Watson revealed
harmonious human interaction with the environment
and self-sufficiency for village communities. Even
under conditions of substantial outmigration for men
and rising population density [2.32 per cent annual
increase between 1933 and 1952; Willis 1966], an
adequate food intake could still be ensured.
54
Twenty-five years on, fingermillet had become
displaced by cassava and hybrid iaize; a transition
then not yet known in southern Tanzania. (The latter
point is important since international borders are part
of the make-up of peripheral economies.) The
displacement occurred when cultivators found it
increasingly difficult to meet labour requirements for
millet. Its ultimate cause was the ever-increasing
pressure on the land, leading to shorter fallow periods.
If continuous monocropping is also practised,
cropping will activate the growth of weeds and
heighten the need for weeding - which invariably is a
task for women.
Substitution of cassava, a crop which does not have
any peak labour periods, came about throughout the
l960s, after a transition period during which the
Northern Grassland system dropped its emphasis on
crop rotation in favour of millet monocropping.
Hybrid maize was introduced from the late 1960s
onwards. The heigtened pressure on female labour
power made the substitution of cassava and of hybrid
maize seem like reasonable alternatives. The later date
at which hybrid maize became available has led recent
observers to describe the current system as semi-
permanent and based on 'cassava, usually ínter-
cropped with maize or millet' [Mansfield 1975:3]. For
the purpose of my argument, the important
observation is that Mambwe households had become
dependent upon hybrid maize, not so much for its cash
value but for its suitability as a food crop. Maize had
solved a labour problem. Under the circumstances of
the late 1970s. with growing land shortage and more
continuous cultivation, it was not possible to reduce or
drop maize production. At the same time an acute
cash shortage had also developed, and was felt by both
men and women. The cash needs of men related to the
collapse of the system of circulatory migration; those
of women related to the loss of fertility in kitchen
gardens (ivizule). It was from those gardens that
women used to earn an independent income during the
heyday of migration for men. Through the loss of
earning power the cash constraint became endemic.
The need for cash thus added to the importance of
maize. By the late l970s maize had become an
ambiguous staple, being both a food crop and a cash
crop. Mambwe villagers, then, had two good reasons
for not dropping the state/maize option, and their
chief (in the case study) had acted in accordance with
those reasons.
The long-term ecological dangers of hybrid maize
cropping, which depends heavily on inorganic
fertilisers were not in evidence during the early stages
of adoption. Even in the late l970s, potential dangers
such as soil salinisation or decline of organic matter
concentration, both of which may be caused by
repeated use of nitrogen [Bury 1983:284], were not
locally recognised. What did matter was that the
grassland Manibwe had relegated millet to a
subsidiary crop, whereas their Tanzanian neighbours
continued with 'traditional' millet farming. Con-
sequently, the higher reliance on cassava and maize
could easily be countered through imports. Southern
Tanzania at that time was known for its 'black market'
surpluses [Bury 1983:274].
Conclusion
In I above we looked at 'traditional' and 'party
official' reactions to state intervention. The regional
setting was marked by low cash flows and inadequate
assistance for implementing the maize-based national
food strategy. Local-level party politicians displayed
two distinct attitudes, depending on context. When
sharing official platforms they backed the national
programme and joined in the exhortations for 'feeding
the nation'; in their day-to-day contacts with villagers
the same politicians sympathised with the people's
need for better remuneration and more immediate
rewards for their labour. The politicians' unofficial
advice, their urging people to invest in the more
lucrative bean trade (stressing production of beans)
was well-intended, but was also based on the
erroneous assumption that such investments would
end all problems. Yes, switching to beans would ease
the desperate need for cash, which is an increasingly
important aspect of Africa's agricultural crisis [Pottier
l985:23ff]; but what about labour? And is maize
locally perceived as a cash crop?
The contrast between the chief's concern to keep both
trade options open and the politicians' advice to stop
producing surplus maize was explained in II above.
Here I argued that villagers, and their traditional
leader, cannot possibly conceptualise the marketing
alternatives as an either/or issue. In spite of the
obvious advantages that accrue to investing in beans,
villagers are reluctant to drop maize production, since
maizeunlike any other staple - had the ambiguous
status of being both a cash and a food crop [see also
Wright 1983). Maize, moreover, when it was first
introduced, had alleviated the problem of weeding in
fields carrying millet. Some of the 'magic' of hybrid
maize cropping lived on.
But not all aspects of maize production were thought
to have been positive. Although women too had
welcomed maize when it was introduced, the hybrid
had been responsible for taking away the women's
prerogative of maize trading. As a result of this, some
women were less explicit about the virtues of growing
hybrid maize. Men, in contrast, still valued maize as a
labour-saver, but they reasoned that women's labour
('saved' in millet fields) could be redeployed on the
commercial fields which they (the men) controlled.
Therefore, when Chief Mwamba acted in the interest
of 'his people', he acted essentially from a man's point
of view. Women who had negotiated with their
husbands the right to own/sell part of the maize
destined for cash purposes approved of the chief's
strategy, but many others did not. Women who had
lost their hold over maize trading cared less about
whether or not the state/maize option was kept alive.
Moreover, the AFC parastatal did not (and still does
not) provide credit to women household heads.
The following conclusions deserve to be stressed. A
traditional authority who takes his people's problems
to heart will view the marketing alternatives in terms
of a frame of analysis which includes elements from
marketing andfrom t he production process. Local-level
politicians, in contrast, are more likely, if they
sympathise, to take a view which leaves out the total
context of a given food culture. Secondly, the
knowledge behind the chief's position, though richer
than any understanding achieved by the 'outside'
politicians, remains essentially a male point of view.
Finally, I am flot attempting to justify the Mambwe
emphasis on extensive trading, because current
practices (e.g. insufficient crop rotation and inadequate
resting of land) pose far too serious a threat to long-
term survival prospects. As an outsider I am
concerned about the negative consequences of
overreacting to the market incentive. Over-cultivation
is beginning to make its mark. On the other hand, I
accept the villagers' viewpoint that under present
circumstances (i.e. no migrant remittances; NCU
inefficiency), cooperation with Watch Tower and/or
other private traders is the best short-term antidote to
rural impoverishment. Their view is a true local-level
recognition of the need, formulated by Berg, not to
overburden public sector institutions with the
responsibilities of organising an adequate marketing
and input strategy [World Bank 1981].
Planners must respect people's views. In the case of the
Mambwe, these views translate as something akin to a
Bergian perspective. Planners should also, however,
address the grim fact that long-term ecological stress
may set in if the desire for competitive trading
becomes too laissez faire. A further recommendation,
therefore, is that programmes for conscience raising
must be embarked upon. Ensuring that all food
producers control, at the very least, the product of
their labour would be one of the objectives of such a
programme [see e.g. Muntemba 1982:48]; ensuring
that future generations too will be entitled to work the
land would be another.
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